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Abstract By way of an analysis of Arendt’s defense of the public/private
distinction in The Human Condition, this essay offers a re-interpretation of
the status of the family as a realm where the categories of action and speech
play a vital role. The traditional criterion for the establishment of the
public/private distinction is grounded in an idealization of the family as a
sphere where a unity of interests destroys the conditions for the categories
of action and speech. This essay takes issue with this assumption and argues
that the traditional conception has had a pernicious effect not only on
women, but on men as well. This argument is supported by locating a fissure
in Arendt’s analysis of this distinction that suggests a profound structural
affinity between the public realm and the family.
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Ultimately, Carole Pateman asserts, the dichotomy between private and
public is ’what the feminist movement is all about’.1 Her contention:
underlying the traditional, liberal political theory which clearly separates
and opposes the public and the private, there lies ’an unequal opposi-
tion between men and women’.2 Furthermore, under the beguiling
’egalitarianism’ and ’ostensible individualism’3 of liberal theory, this
basic prejudice has become obscured, indeed, camouflaged. However,
feminist writers have increasingly exposed this prejudice and have thus
challenged the unequivocal acceptance of the dichotomy between public
and private. Vital to this critique has been an investigation into the
nature of the family and the extent to which historically political notions
such as justice may be applied to this traditionally strictly private realm.
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Susan Moller Okin focuses on this issue in her critique of traditional
liberal theories of justice. Her assertion is that the family has been ideal-
ized by such influential theorists as Rousseau and Hume, and it has
therefore been generally assumed that, ’the affection and unity of inter-
ests that prevail within families make standards of justice irrelevant to
them’.4 It is precisely this ’affection and unity of interests’ which has, at
least in part, historically distinguished the private from the public.5 This
idealization of the family is insidious because, to follow Okin, it denies
the reality that family life encompasses much more than simple affection
and is often characterized by violence and injustice.6 Thus, one side of
the gender bias endemic to the traditional conception of the
private/public dichotomy comes into focus; for by idealizing the family
in this manner, the traditional conception denies the injustices that occur
in this realm, often at the expense of its women and children members.
However, the other side of this bias is frequently eclipsed; for the same
denial of a diversity of perspectives in the family has often effectively
excluded male family members from full participation in this tradition-
ally female sphere. Therefore, such an idealization cuts both ways. By
positing the family as the realm of necessity and by designating this as
the proper realm of women, fathers are often sequestered from the joys
and responsibilities endemic to the private sphere. On the other hand,
by sequestering the categories of action and justice from the private
realm, the traditional view ignores the fact that the family is a sphere
where a variety of distinct voices are in play and, therefore, where stan-
dards of justice and accountability are vital. The sphere of the family,
therefore, provides a particularly fecund topos from which to re-think
the assumptions underlying the strict distinction between public and
private. There is perhaps no other realm of human existence in which
the ’unequal opposition between men and women’ inherent to the
traditional conception of this distinction manifests itself so clearly. In
order to initiate this process of re-interpretation, I will attempt to eluci-
date the traditional distinction by focusing on the phenomenology of the
public and private found in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition.
The clarity of her defense of this distinction and the peculiar status of
the family found therein suggest the extent to which the traditional
criteria underlying this distinction are phenomenologically untenable.
On the one hand, the status of the family in Arendt is clear: she
explicitly relegates the family to the private realm and thus excludes it
from the categories of action and speech. On the other hand, there seems
to be another sense in which she speaks about the family that hints at a
fissure in this strict and, for Arendt, vital distinction.7 In these passages,
Arendt suggests that there is a certain, albeit always qualified, manner
in which we may speak of a ’family world’.8 This is indeed remarkable
considering that she explicitly thematizes ’worldliness’ as an essential
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characteristic of the public realm. She writes: ’the term &dquo;public&dquo; signi-
fies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distin-
guished from our privately owned place in it.’9 The extent to which one
may speak of a ’family world’ in Arendt is, to be sure, quite limited, if
even possible at all. However, an investigation into Arendt’s notion of
the family, through an elucidation of both the public/private distinction
and the nature of her twofold definition of the public sphere, may lend
insight into the extent to which we may take advantage of this fissure in
the distinction in order to ascribe a certain worldliness to the family. In
this manner, I will offer the very un-Arendtian suggestion that the family
is indeed a realm where action and speech are vital.10
The polis/oikos dichotomy
In The Human Condition Arendt begins her discussion of the
public/private distinction by invoking the Greek understanding of the
polis as opposed to the oikos, and she remains loyal to this ancient
distinction throughout. Therefore, an adumbration of the Greek, and
particularly Aristotelian, notion of the polis/oikos dichotomy provides
the groundwork from which to investigate Arendt’s own conception of
this distinction. The Greek notion rests upon the distinction between
two levels of human association: the one political, formed for the sake
of communal living, the other natural, concerned primarily with the
daily needs of life. Arendt writes: ’According to Greek thought, the
human capacity for political organization is not only different from but
stands in direct opposition to that natural association whose center is
the home (oikos) and the family.’l Aristotle asserts that there is an essen-
tial and irreducible difference between the household and the state. 12
The household, though a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of
the polls, is a different level of association. For the household, ’formed
by nature for the daily needs of life’,13 has its end not in itself, but rather
in the establishment of the polis, which ’exists for the sake of living
well’.14 However, the mastering of necessity is, in fact, the pre-condition
for the freedom of the pohs:
The realm of the polls ... was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a
relationship between these two spheres [the polis and the oikos], it was a
matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the house-
hold was the condition for freedom of the polas.ls
Therefore, the polis itself is both distinguished from and grounded upon
the oikos - the condition for the possibility of freedom and equality
which characterize the realm of the polis is the oikos; for, according to
Arendt, part of what it meant to be free was not to be subject to the
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necessities of life.l6 This freedom and equality were, however, explicitly
denied to the realm of the household; for the head of the household was
considered free only insofar as he could ’rise’ from the ’shadows’ of the
private sphere and enter the political where all were equal.17
Labor and action
Arendt’s entire discussion of the vita activa must be viewed against the
backdrop of this model of the Greek polis; for her categories, or ’exis-
tentialia’18 of labor, work and action are presented as conditions charac-
teristic of a specific realm of human existence. The identification of
elements of the vita activa with their proper dwelling place may be eluci-
dated through an investigation into the two existentialia of labor and
action;19 for, here, Arendt clearly identifies the former with the private
and the later with the public. For Arendt, the ’existential’ of labor is that
element of the vita activa associated with the necessities of life. Here too,
she appeals to the essentially Greek notion that ’[t]o labor meant to be
enslaved by necessity, and this enslavement was inherent in the
conditions of human life’.20 Laboring is inherently endless; the living
organism requires incessant care. Arendt writes:
The common characteristic of both, the biological process in man and the
process of growth and decay in the world, is that they are part of the cycli-
cal movement of nature and therefore endlessly repetitive; all human activi-
ties which arise out of the necessity to cope with them are bound to the
recurring cycles of nature and have in themselves no beginning and no
end.21
Labor, therefore, may be understood as the activity corresponding to the
human condition of necessity and therefore may be identified with the
private realm in which the management of life’s ’daily needs’ is essen-
tial.22 For Arendt, therefore, the activity of labor corresponds to the
private sphere and must be distinguished from that activity which is
unequivocally identified with the public realm: action.
Arendt begins her discussion of action thus: ’Human plurality, the
basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of
equality and distinction.’23 Equality is essential, for, without it, humans
would be unable to understand each other; there would be no common
ground upon which to meet. Distinctness, however, is itself vital, for,
without it, neither speech nor action would be necessary for people to
reach common understanding. Indeed, speech and action reveal the
unique distinctness of the individual. This revelatory quality requires a
space of appearance, a ’world’ in which who an individual is may be
disclosed through her/his words and deeds. This occurs ’where people
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are with each other and neither for nor against them - that is, in sheer
human togetherness’.24 For Arendt, therefore, action requires a plural-
ity of people existing together in equality; in other words, it requires a
truly ’public’ realm in the sense of the Greek polis. Arendt’s appropria-
tion of this conception of the ’public’ must now be investigated in an
attempt to clarify the status of the family within her conception of the
public/private dichotomy; in this manner, the limited sense in which it is
possible to speak of a family ’world’ will come into focus.
The public realm
Publicity
As we have seen, for Arendt, the ’existential’ of labor, embracing the
basic condition of human necessity and thus corresponding to the
private realm, and the ’existential’ of action, characterized by freedom
and equality and properly located within the realm of the public, remain
consistent with the basic Greek distinction between the oikos and polis.
For Arendt, there are two interrelated, but not identical phenomena
characteristic of the ’public’ realm. The first may be designated as
’publicity’, the second as ’worldliness’. First, the public means ’that
everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody
else and has the widest possible publicity’.25 This conception of the
public sphere is closely related to the Greek notion of the twofold func-
tion of the polis. According to Arendt, the Greek polis (1) ’was supposed
to multiply the occasions to win &dquo;immortal fame,&dquo; that is, to multiply
the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and
word who he was in his unique distinctness’; and (2) ’was to offer a
remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed
deserving fame would not be forgotten, that it actually would become
&dquo;immortal,&dquo; were not very good’.26 This definition of the public is
profoundly connected with Arendt’s conception of the ’glory’ and ’great-
ness’ endemic to all true action:
... action can be judged only by the criterion of greatness because it is in
its nature to break through the commonly accepted and reach into the
extraordinary, where whatever is true in common everyday life no longer
applies because everything that exists is unique.... Greatness, therefore, or
the specific meaning of each deed, can lie only in the performance itself and
neither in its motivation nor its achievement.27
Thus, as publicity, the public realm is the place of glory and greatness,
the space where actions are recognized and affirmed. Indeed, it is the
realm of immortality, where stories are told and remembered. However,
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I tend to agree with Pitkin’s terse and unequivocal critique of this under-
standing of the public:
But besides being obscure, this way of conceptualizing action is self-defeat-
ing. For, in the first place, action connected to nothing that precedes or
follows it seems pointless and arbitrary. And, in the second place, the appeal
to heroism and glory unconnected to any standard of right transcending the
individual is bound to produce at best empty posturing, at worst, violence
and war.28
However, this first definition of the public, i.e. as publicity, though over-
invested in the Greek conception of glory and greatness, retains its
significance by pointing to an ineluctable difference between the public
and the private. There is a certain breadth of reality inherent to the
public realm conceived as publicity with which the private realm cannot
and should not compete. The family is, by definition, excluded from this
conception of the public; for the family, as a realm restricted to a limited
number of members, is inherently a ’limited reality’.29 Indeed, on
Arendt’s view, the extent to which we may even predicate ’reality’ of the
family is questionable; for ’appearance ... constitutes reality’3° and the
family, strictly speaking, does not seem to be a realm of appearance for
Arendt. An investigation into the ’worldliness’ endemic to the public
sphere will lend insight into this issue and suggest a different way of
speaking about the public realm which may, to a certain degree, be
applicable to the family.
Worldliness
On one level, Arendt clearly distinguishes the ’worldly’ from the private:
’[T]he term &dquo;public&dquo; signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common
to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it.’31
However, the ’world’ of which Arendt speaks does not designate the
earth or nature, but rather the space which appears between people ’and
in which everything that individuals carry with them innately can
become visible and audible’.32 The ’between’ characteristic of ’worldli-
ness’ may, in a certain sense, be understood materialistically. What
Arendt has in mind is a situation not unlike a table around which a
group of people sit. The table is precisely between the people, it sepa-
rates and relates them at once.33 Thus, ’betweenness’ is related to the
human artifact, the product of homo faber; for ’[t]o live together in the
world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have
it in common’.34 However, this materialistic or objective description
does not fully account for the deeper, less tangible conception of the
’between’ as the proper space of speech and action. This Arendt calls
the ’subjective in-between’ and suggests by this a realm in which the
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distinctive character of the individual may be revealed through her/his
words and deeds.
Most action and speech is concerned with this in-between ... so that most
words and deeds are about worldly objective reality in addition to being a
disclosure of the acting and speaking agent... this in-between is no less
real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality
the ’web’ of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat
intangible quality.35
Thus, for Arendt, the ’in-between’ which characterizes the public qua
world has a twofold character, the one objective, corresponding to the
condition of work, the other inter-subjective, corresponding to the
condition of action.36
However, there are two other vital characteristics of worldliness
which must be elucidated. The first may be referred to as ’perspectival
plurality’, the second, as ’permanence’. With regard to the former,
Arendt writes:
... the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable
perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for
which no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised. For
though the common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who
are present have different locations in it, and the location of one can no
more comcide with the location of another than the location of two
objects. 37
Action and speech derive their meaning from this aspect of the public
realm; for as everyone sees and hears from a different position, speak-
ing and acting with others attain true significance as the activity neces-
sary for self-disclosure. Thus, the presence of ’innumerable perspectives’
is a condition for the activities of speech and action and marks the
second primary characteristic of the public qua world. Finally, with
regard to ’permanence’, Arendt writes:
If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one gener-
ation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of
mortal men. Without this transcendence into a potential earthly immortal-
ity, no politics, strictly speaking, no common world and no public realm is
possible.38
The world is marked by permanence; it is that which we enter at birth
and that from which we depart at death. Thus, it outlasts our sojourn
here. Arendt asserts that this permanence may be achieved only insofar
as the common world appears in public: ’But such a common world can
survive the coming and going to the generations only to the extent that
it appears in public.’39 The publicity character of the public realm
mentioned above is vital to the achievement of world permanence for
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Arendt; for it is this publicity that, through the centuries, absorbs and
preserves what must be saved of ephemeral human activity.
Thus, this second definition of the public, that is, as world, encom-
passes three essential characteristics: betweenness, perspectival plurality
and permanence. It is this second understanding of the public which
may, to a certain extent, be appropriated to the realm of the family.
Indeed, although Arendt defines the notion of the public qua world over
against the first notion of the public qua publicity, she clearly views these
two definitions as profoundly interrelated.4° Therefore, to think the
worldly nature of the public apart from its ’publicity’ character is to
truncate Arendt’s description of the public sphere. It is, in fact, to think
the public in a limited fashion. However, it is precisely this limited way
of thinking about the public which opens up the possibility of rethink-
ing the status of the family beyond the traditional framework; for there
seems to be a certain sense in which we may predicate the three charac-
teristics of the public qua world of the family. The extent to which this
is in fact possible may be ascertained through an investigation into
Arendt’s brief and often tangential comments concerning the family.
The family
For Arendt, the term ’family’, used almost interchangeably with the term
’household’, designates a natural association which is inherently private.
Indeed, not unlike the Greek oikos, the family both serves the life process
and provides protection and refuge from the outside world of the public.
In ’What is Freedom?’ Arendt writes: ’the public realm stands in the
sharpest possible contrast to our private domain, where, in the protection
of family and home, everything serves and must serve the security of the
life process.’41 Thus, Arendt’s own understanding of the family, echoes the
above discussed Greek conception of the oikos; for, like the oikos, the role
of the family is to manage the life process. Closely related to this concern
and care for the biological necessities of life is a second element charac-
teristic of the family: to provide a safe refuge from the world.
Because the child must be protected against the world, his traditional place
is in the family, whose adult members daily return back from the outside
world and withdraw into the security of private life within four walls. These
four walls, within which people’s private life is lived, constitute a shield
against the world and specifically against the public aspect of the world.
They enclose a secure place, without which no living thing can thrive. This
holds good not only for the life of childhood but for human life in general.42
This aspect of the private realm is vital, for, on Arendt’s view, the public
realm, as the sphere of action and indeed work, does not concern itself
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with the necessities required for the maintenance of human existence.
Therefore, because she thematizes the public as the sphere of freedom
which excludes the concerns of necessity, Arendt requires that the private
realm be a place into which one can withdraw in order to tend to the
necessities of life.43
This place of calm, rejuvenating protection is the private sphere of
the family. Indeed, for Arendt, the family inherently provides sanctuary
from the world; for love is the mode of association endemic to it and
love is intrinsically ’worldless’. She writes, ’Love, by reason of its
passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates us
from others.’44 For Arendt, passion and compassion naturally destroy
the in-between because they have ’no capacity for generalization’.
Compassion, by its very nature, cannot be touched off by the sufferings of
a whole class or people, or, least of all, mankind as a whole. It cannot reach
out further than what is suffered by one person and still remain what it is
supposed to be, co-suffering. Its strength hinges on the strength of passion
itself, which, in contrast to reason, can comprehend only the particular, but
has no notion of the general and no capacity for generalization.45
Due to its passion, love is unable to sustain the plurality inherent to the
public realm; for love knows only singularity, it abolishes distance and is
therefore unable to provide the necessary universality and impartiality
requisite for the establishment and maintenance of institutions.46 ’Because
of its inherent worldlessness, love can only become false and perverted
when it is used for political purposes such as the change or salvation of
the world.’47 Thus, love is essentially ’anti-political’48 and must necessarily
dwell in the private realm. As has been seen, the emergence of a space of
appearance, the necessary condition for action and speech, is restricted
exclusively to the public sphere. It is, in fact, love’s decisive destruction of
the in-between which sequesters the family from the world and thus,
strictly speaking, denies the possibility of familial action and speech.
However, it is simply an idealization of the notion of love itself to
attempt to argue that love destroys all distance and therefore the possi-
bility of the emergence of a world between lovers. It is far more the case
that love is only possible on the condition that an attempt ever again is
made to traverse the distance, to meet the other as other, without
attempting to assimilate and reduce the other’s independent and unique
perspective to one’s own. Love is not reducible to passion and compas-
sion because there is never a complete destruction of distance between
unique individuals. Therefore, love always has a certain ’worldly’ char-
acter to the extent that there always exists between two people a space
of disclosure. Indeed, Arendt herself points to an essential affinity
between the phenomenon of love and that of action:
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For love, although it is one of the rarest occurrences in human lives, indeed
possesses an unequaled power of self-revelation and unequaled clarity of
vision for the disclosure of who, precisely because it is unconcerned to the
point of unworldlmess with what the loved person may be.49
It is precisely this element of self-disclosure built into the phenomenon
of love that offers the possibility of speaking of the family as a realm of
action and speech. Indeed, because the ’who’ and the ’what’ a person is
are never, save in theory, completely separable, love itself is never entirely
’unconcerned to the point of unworldliness with what the loved person
may be’, rather, although the disclosure of who the loved one is takes on
a primary significance in love relationships, the far more banal, but
nevertheless important, disclosure of what the loved one may be is
always already co-disclosed. It is an uncritical acceptance of the
traditionally idealized model of the family to argue that in this realm
love is the exclusive mode of self-revelation. To the contrary, I would
argue that the family is a realm in which not only love but also action
and speech are essential modes of self-disclosure, and therefore, that the
family always has a certain ’worldly’ character, because the space
’between’ its members is never completely abolished.
The fissure
There are places where Arendt herself speaks of a certain kind of world
with regard to the family. She writes:
As long as [love’s] spell lasts, the only in-between which may insert itself
between two lovers is the child, love’s product. The child, this in-between
to which the lovers now are related and which they hold in common, is
representative of the world in that it also separates them; it is an mdication
that they will insert a new world into the existing world.50
This passage points to the possibility of taking advantage of a fissure in
Arendt’s strict distinction between the public and private, and, though
perhaps not necessarily contradictory to her identification of the family
with the private realm, it provides a path upon which to travel in the
attempt to examine the extent to which Arendt’s own language lends
itself to the possibility of a conception of family which includes action
and speech. 51
Betweenness
Insight into this issue may be gained by recalling Arendt’s second defi-
nition of the public, i.e. qua world; for perhaps the three elements of this
conception - betweenness, perspectival plurality and permanence - may
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be appropriated to the discussion concerning the possibility of a ’family
world’, and therefore, may be used as a basis for re-thinking the status
of the family within the distinction between public and private. On
Arendt’s view, the birth of a child amounts to the insertion of an ’in-
between’ into the love relationship of the parents. This birth itself is ’in
a sense, the end of love’.52 The significance of this comment is that the
essential worldlessness endemic to love has, with the birth of a between,
been destroyed. Thus, the condition of natality, a characteristic Arendt
thematizes in the section concerning action, plays a vital role within the
family as well. The birth of a child into a family has a twofold nature.
On the one hand, ’[h]uman parents ... have not only summoned their
children into life through conception and birth, they have simul-
taneously introduced them into a world’,53 and on the other hand, the
child has, conversely, introduced a sort of world between the parents.
To be sure, Arendt differentiates between the creation of a world and
the beginning of a beginner:
This beginning [birth] is not the same as the creation of the world; it is not
the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a begmner himself.
With the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world
itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of
freedom was created when man was created but not before.54
However, insofar as the relationship between the parents was charac-
terized by the essential worldlessness of love, the birth of their child may
be considered the destruction of this worldlessness and the emergence of
a world between them. Thus, not only is a child born into a world, but
this birth itself signifies the birth of a world. The fact of natality seems
to bridge the gulf between action and the family in The Human
Condition; for action, as ’a beginning which corresponds to the fact of
birth’ and ’the actualization of the human condition of natality’,55 plays
a central role in the realm of the family. Not only is the child born into
a world, but more specifically, into a family. The family itself is the site
of the ’startling unexpectedness’ and ’infinite improbability’ which is
inherent in the birth of a beginner and endemic to the ’existential’ of
action.
The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be
expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable.
And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so that with
each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.56
Thus, on Arendt’s own view, the essentially un-Arendtian notion that it
is possible to predicate action, and by implication speech, of the family
follows; for it seems that the insertion of a between into the love relation-
ship marks the emergence of a familial world which is the condition for
the possibility of speech and action. In fact, natality, as the actualization
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of a beginning, may be considered the very paradigm example of action;
for like all action, it is an activity by which an agent inserts
herself/himself into the world. Ironically, it is Arendt’s own idealization
of love, by which all in-betweenness is destroyed in the love relationship,
which forces her to stress the phenomenon of birth so strongly; and, in
fact, this is precisely the site of the fissure in her conception of the
public/private distinction. However, if one denies the idealization of love
which entails a destruction of the ’in-between’, the requirement of the
birth of a child is no longer necessary to establish a familial worldli-
ness.57
Perspectival plurality
The extent to which Arendt’s own analysis allows the ’world’ to be
predicated of the family remains to be seen. Thus far only the sense in
which a between may be introduced into the realm of the family has been
elucidated, without my mentioning the second and third characteristics
of what Arendt designates as the ’world’, namely, ’perspectival plural-
ity’ and ’permanence’. As has been seen, Arendt identifies the charac-
teristic of ’innumerable perspectives’ with the public realm and thus
explicitly distinguishes it from the private.58
This is the meaning of public life, compared to which even the richest and
most satisfying family life can offer only the prolongation or multiplicationof one’s own position wIth its attending aspects and perspectives. The/~ oMe~ OM~M o~oM M//~ ~ ~CM~M~ ~p ~ ~~~ e~ ~~.
subjectivity of privacy can be prolonged and multiplied in a family, it can
even become so strong that its weight is felt in the public realm; but this
family ’world’ can never replace the reality rising out of the sum total ofaspects presented by one object to a multitude of spectators.59
Thus, Arendt herself appears to accept a certain notion of a ’family
world’ in which a ’subjectivity of privacy’ may be sustained. Her point
seems to be that the reality of this ’world’ is inherently ’limited’,6° and
thus, strictly speaking, private; for it is opposed to the radical publicity
which characterizes the truly public sphere. For Arendt, the ’family
world’ constitutes a limited reality precisely because it lacks a multi-
plicity of perspectives. Therefore, it may not be considered a ’space of
appearance’ in the strict sense of the term.61 For Arendt, reality under-
stood as appearance to a plurality of perspectives, is explicitly excluded
from the realm of the family in which there is only ’the multiplicity and
prolongation of one’s own position with its attending aspects and
perspectives’. Although there is an undeniable truth to Arendt’s assertion
that the family, as a sphere limited to a certain number of members, has
a finitude unknown to the public understood in its widest sense as
’publicity’, the notion that the family is characterized by a single position
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multiplied is both antiquated and phenomenologically false. Indeed,
Arendt’s position here echoes the idealization of the family so charac-
teristic of traditional liberal political theory.62 This idealization seems to
obscure the distinction between unity and identity; for, although the
family may be unified by certain goals and interests, the position of any
one of its members can never be identified with another.63 Susan Okin
puts it this way: ’however much the members of families care about one
another and share common ends, they are still discrete persons with their
own particular aims and hopes, which may sometimes conflict.’64 This
is the primary reason why action and speech must be existentialia applic-
able to the family. The notion that individuals in families retain their
irreducible uniqueness justifies the attempt to import these two ’exis-
tentialia’ into this sphere; for, even here, there is a variety (though, it
must be granted, not an ’innumerable multiplicity’) of perspectives,
which hints at the wider sphere of relation that constitutes the public
realm.65 Just as members of the public sphere occupy distinct positions,
so too do members of the family retain their irreducible uniqueness
within the private sphere. Thus, the second aspect of Arendt’s definition
of the ’world’ may, to a certain degree, be predicated of the family; and
to take Arendt’s vocabulary and appropriate it in a very un-Arendtian
manner, the family may be spoken of as a space of appearance in which
reality emerges as distinct individuals meet one another in all their simi-
larity and uniqueness.
Permanence
Finally, with regard to the third aspect of Arendt’s conception of ’world’,
i.e. permanence, the family, like the ’world’, transcends the single life-
span of the individual. Thus, although, strictly speaking, the family is
not ’erected’ in the manner of the public realm,66 it retains a continuity
through the generations. In this way, the family, like the public sphere,
achieves a certain permanence in which, indeed, stories handed down
from parent to child, or grandparent to grandchild, continue to reveal
the who of ancestors long since dead. And although these stories lack
the glory endemic to those of the public qua publicity, they preserve no
less the immortality of agents past and augment no less profoundly the
’web of human relationships which exists wherever men live together’. 67
However, it is precisely due to Arendt’s over-investment in the public
understood as ’publicity’ that she sequesters the existentialia of speech
and action from the family. By speaking of the ’family world’ as a
’limited reality’ in which the management of the life process is the
primary function, Arendt herself, on the one hand, idealizes the family,
thus concocting it into a calm and peaceful sphere of rejuvenation, which
it in fact often precisely is not, and, on the other hand, denies the true
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depth and significance of this sphere as a place of speech and action, a
space of appearance in which reality unfolds. Nevertheless, according to
Arendt’s own conception of ’worldliness’, there is a way in which the
public and the private realms flow into one another; for, as has been
shown, the three aspects that characterize the public qua world (i.e.
betweenness, perspectival plurality, and permanence) may, to a certain
degree, be ascribed to the family.
The family world
This analysis of the family provides the basis from which to begin re-
thinking the status of the family beyond its idealization as a sphere exclu-
sively dedicated to the care of life’s necessities. It thus suggests a way to
thematize the family beyond the either/or dichotomy imposed upon it by
traditional liberal political theory. This vision of the family would there-
fore involve the phenomenologically more realistic view that families are
associations between unique individuals in which the existentialia of
action and speech and, by extension, the categories of justice and
accountability play a vital role. Action and speech are central to family
life because the two basic conditions of these ’existentialia’ - equality
and distinctness - apply to its members.6g This need not, however, imply
the complete destruction of the public/private distinction; for indeed,
Arendt’s analysis itself has indicated quite clearly that there is, at the very
least, a quantitative difference between these two realms. However, it
does call into question the traditional way of conceptualizing this
distinction which has not only, as Pateman insists, had a pernicious effect
on women, but has also had the effect of sequestering men from full
participation in the life of the family. It is, therefore, not the distinction
in itself which is necessarily to be denied - although it is unclear and
beyond the scope of this essay to identify what precisely the benefits of
holding this distinction in fact are69 - but rather, it is the denial of one
or the other sex from equal access to both spheres. By importing Arendt’s
conception of action and speech into the realm of the family, I have
suggested the possibility of opening the borders between these two
realms, which would in fact allow for the free passage of both sexes. It
is only once this freedom of movement is established that women may
attain access to traditionally male realms. However, equally important
is the other direction of exchange; for males too will not only be held
accountable for their actions in their families, but they will also be
permitted to participate fully in the joys and responsibilities of this
traditionally female sphere. Okin points to the vital importance of this
opening of the borders:
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Only when men participate equally in what have been principally women’s
realms of meeting the daily material and psychological needs of those close
to them, and when women participate equally in what have been princi-
pally men’s realms of larger scale production, government, and intellectual
and creative life, will members of both sexes be able to develop a more
complete human personality than has hitherto been possible
The development of this ’more complete human personality’ has been
facilitated by a more complete human conception of the family which
holds the tension between individual distinctness and common interest,
thus affirming the importance of action and speech in this realm. It is
only once the family is apprehended as a ’world’ in which action and
speech are essential ’existentialia’, that it emerges as a realm in which
both men and women may hold one another accountable and demand
the freedom to participate in the full breadth of human reality. Hannah
Arendt’s political theory, though perhaps essentially opposed to such a
conception of the family, illuminates a path for its development; for her
attempt to maintain the strict distinction between public and private
suggests the possibility of a different way of thinking about the family
as a ’world’ and thus as a realm in which action and speech are vital.
New School for Social Research,
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Notes
1 (Pateman, 1983: 281).
2 (ibid.: 283).
3 (ibid.).
4 (Okin, 1989: 31).
5 Since the Greeks, an essential characteristic of the public realm has been the
presence of a multiplicity of perspectives and opinions between equal
members of an association. See (Arendt, 1958: 175 ff.), where Arendt
discusses the role plurality plays in the condition of speech and action, a
condition strictly limited to the public realm.
6 (Okin, 1989: 31).
7 This distinction is indeed vital for Arendt insofar as it underlies her critique
of modern mass society. ’The emergence of society - the rise of housekeep-
ing, its activities, problems, and organizational devices - from the shadowy
interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, has not only
blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed
almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their signifi-
cance for the life of the individual and the citizen’ (Arendt, 1958: 38). For
Arendt, the cost of blurring the distinction between public and private is
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the emergence of ’mass society’ which replaces human action with ’normal-
izing’ behavior. Cf. Notes 17, 24 and 70 below.
8 (Arendt, 1958: 57, 242).
9 (ibid.: 52).
10 This suggestion is not Arendtian because it is clearly contrary to Arendt’s
own definition of action which requires the element of glory endemic to a
truly public space of appearance for its existence: action which does not
appear in public is something other than action in Arendtian terms. See
ibid.: 180. However, it will be argued below that although this element of
glory cannot be a part of the private sphere, nevertheless, there are a
remarkable number of structural affinities between Arendt’s description of
the public sphere and a non-idealized vision of the family which allow us
to speak in terms of a ’family world’, and, therefore, to import the
conditions of action and speech into this realm. Once this has been accom-
plished, the categories of justice and accountability leak into the family
from without, so to speak.
11 (ibid.: 24).
12 (Apostle, 1986: 1252a8-19).
13 (ibid.: 1252b13).
14 (ibid.: 1252b31 ). It is perhaps germane to mention that it is precisely a
distinction between entities that have their end in themselves and those that
do not which underlies Aristotle’s description of the difference between
natural beings on the one hand, and artifacts on the other. This distinction
is at the core of the dichotomy between physis and techne in Aristotle’s
physical and metaphysical writings. However, an analysis of his discussion
of the difference between change (kinesis) and activity (energeia) in Book
8(6) of the Metaphysics, (see Apostle, 1979: 1048a25-1048b37) should
indicate the manner in which activity, which is a special mode of existence
endemic to natural beings, is prior, although structurally related, to the
notion of change which is particularly applicable to artifacts. Thus, the
nature of life itself is thought in terms of activity in Aristotle. Therefore, by
thematizing the oikos as that realm which has its end outside of itself,
Aristotle, like Arendt and perhaps inconsistent with the arguments found
in his metaphysical writings, sequesters the oikos from the category of
action.
15 (Arendt, 1958: 50).
16 (ibid.: 32).
17 (ibid.: 32 and 38). Again, it is precisely the destruction of the strictly private
sphere, in relation to which the truly public could be defined, which Arendt
identifies as the insidious rise of the social, a realm in which the action
endemic to the Greek polis has been replaced by mass behavior (ibid.: 38).
Cf. Notes 7, 24 and 70.
18 (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1984: 197). I agree essentially with their claim
that Arendt’s categories of the human condition may be understood as ’exis-
tentialia’ in the Heideggerian sense; i.e. ’they seek to illuminate what it
means to be-in-the-world’.
19 Work, though a vital aspect of the vita activa, will be bracketed; for the
question as to its proper realm is rather sticky. Arendt seems to speak of
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homo faber as both a ’world’-builder (Arendt, 1958: 151), and therefore,
in a certain sense, political, and as concerned primarily with objects and
their utility and therefore, ’strictly speaking, unpolitical’ (ibid.: 208). It
should be pointed out, however, that the amphibious nature of work could
itself be exploited to the advantage of an interpretation which attempts to
import the notion of action into the realm of the family. This would be
especially fecund if related to Aristotle’s notion of energeia (itself related to
ergon - work) which is fundamental to the development of his conception
of activity. Cf. Metaphysics 8 and especially Nichomachean Ethics (Apostle,
1975: 1167b34-1168a30), where Aristotle thematizes childbirth as a sort
of work and therefore implicitly relates it to the notion of energeia -that
is, we find a similar fissure in the distinction in Aristotle, ironically also
surrounding the issue of the birth of a child. (For this aspect in Arendt, see
below, page 94 ff.).
20 (Arendt, 1958: 84).
21 (ibid.: 98).
22 Thus, Hanna Pitkin writes of Arendt’s position: ’[The household] was the
proper place for labor, for activities "related to the maintenance of life" ...
just as the more direct necessities of bodily function and species reproduc-
tion are properly hidden away in privacy’ (Pitkin, 1981: 331). Pitkin’s
Arendt quotation is from The Human Condition: (1958: 28 [30 and 62]).
23 (Arendt, 1958: 176).
24 (ibid.: 180). However, for Arendt, this form of ’sheer togetherness’, which
was characteristic of the Greek polis, has been lost; for, with the blurring
of the distinction between private and public, the true meaning of action
has been forgotten. The rise of the ’social’, that ’curiously hybrid’ (ibid.: 35)
realm, has led to the emergence of behavior at the expense of action. The
’social’ sphere, which simultaneously appeared with the birth of the modern
age, and which, strictly speaking, is neither public nor private, ’expects from
each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and
various rules, all of which tend to "normalize" its members, to make them
behave, to exclude the spontaneous action or outstanding achievement’
(ibid.: 40). Thus, for Arendt, the ’social’ suggests a third realm as distin-
guished from the private and the public. It is the thematization and descrip-
tion of this third realm which establish her illuminating critique of
modernity.
25 (Arendt, 1958: 50).
26 (ibid.: 197).
27 (ibid.: 205-6).
28 (Pitkin, 1981: 341). Pitkin realizes that this is not Arendt’s intention and
she says as much in the following paragraph: ’Arendt explicitly disparaged
trivial and vain self-display. Anyone who consciously strives to create a
certain self-image is bound to fail; and any society in which this is a wide-
spread motive is bound to fail.’
29 (Arendt, 1958: 59).
30 (ibid.: 50).
31 (ibid.: 52).
32 (Arendt, 1955: 10).
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33 (Arendt, 1958: 52-3).
34 (ibid.: 52).
35 (ibid.: 182-3; emphasis added).
36 These two conceptions must not be understood as strictly separate, but
rather as profoundly interrelated.




41 (Arendt, 1954: 156; emphasis added).
42 (Arendt, 1954: 186).
43 By arguing that the family is much more than simply a realm which attends
to the necessities of life, that it rather is a sphere where the self-disclosive
element endemic to speech and action is essential, a reinterpretation of the
meaning of the public realm as a sphere where the necessities of life are of
no concern is simultaneously suggested. Such a reinterpretation of the
public would amount to an argument for public policies which take these
necessities into consideration - policies such as, for example, both maternity
and paternity leave, basic health-insurance and the like.
44 (Arendt, 1958: 242).
45 (Arendt, 1963: 85).
46 (ibid.: 86).
47 (Arendt, 1958: 52).
48 (ibid.: 242).
49 (ibid.).
50 (Arendt, 1958: 242; emphasis added). This assertion, besides introducing a
certain worldly quality to the heretofore strictly private realm of the family,
is all the more enigmatic due to Arendt’s curious use of both the present
and future tenses. On the one hand, the birth of the child itself introduces
into the relationship of the lovers an ’in-between’ which suggests the
emergence of at least a limited kind of world. However, on the other hand,
this birth is ’representative’ and only an ’indication’ of an insertion of a new
world which apparently has not yet occurred but will eventually.
51 The question at hand is not whether Arendt’s position is inconsistent, for,
when pressed, the family must, on Arendt’s view, be relegated to the private.
This is clear throughout. Therefore, the following discussion concerning the
extent to which action and speech are possible within the family, though it
appropriates Arendtian terminology, deviates significantly from Arendt’s
own position and must be recognized as so doing.
52 (Arendt, 1958: 242).
53 (Arendt, 1954: 185).
54 (Arendt, 1958: 177).
55 (ibid.: 178).
56 (ibid.).
57 This denial of an idealization of love would open the possibility of
importing the existentialia of speech and action into non-traditional
families (families without children, homosexual families) as well.
58 See page 91 above (Arendt, 1958: 57).
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59 (ibid.; emphasis added).
60 (ibid.: 59).
61 This can be seen in the following quotation: ’To men the reality of the world
is guaranteed by the presence of others, by it appearing to all; "for what
appears to all, this we call Being," and whatever lacks this appearance
comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own
but without reality.’ (ibid.: 199; emphasis added).
62 (Okin, 1989: 26 ff.).
63 Surely Arendt realizes this, for, in a citation cited already above, p. 91, she
clearly indicates the importance and irreducibility of positional distance
which is the condition for the emergence of a space of appearance between
people. Unfortunately, on Arendt’s view this sort of irreducibility of position
does not extend to the realm of the family.
64 (Okin, 1989: 32).
65 It is this very fact that led Martin Buber to write of the way in which,
through the essential experience of marriage, we may come to know
something of the nature of the body politic: ’Marriage, essentially under-
stood, brings one into an essential relation to the "world;" more precisely,
to the body politic, to its malformation and its genuine form, to its sickness
and its health.... He ... who has entered into marriage, has been in
earnest with the fact that the other is; with the fact that I cannot share in
the Present Being without sharing in the being of the other.... But thereby
a man has decisively entered into relation with otherness; and the basic
structure of otherness, in many ways uncanny but never quite unholy or
incapable of being hallowed, in which I and the others who meet me in my
life are inwoven, is the body politic’ (Buber, 1965: 60-1).
66 (Arendt, 1958: 55).
67 (ibid.: 184).
68 This clearly ought to be the case between adult members of the family; and
although young children cannot be considered equal in the same sense, there
remains both a common ground upon which to meet them and a distinct-
ness of perspective, which satisfy the requirements that Arendt suggests as
the conditions for speech and action. See p. 88, above.
69 As I have attempted to illustrate in the notes of this paper, Arendt’s critique
of modern mass society is based on an interpretation of precisely what
happens when the distinction between public and private is blurred. See
Notes 7, 17 and 24. It is, however, not altogether clear that the destruction
of the public/private distinction necessarily leads directly to modern mass
society where the fundamental mode of activity is behavior. The re-
interpretation of the status of the family offered in this paper opens up the
possibility for a re-interpretation of the public realm itself. This is not to
argue that the public realm must be modeled after the family, but rather
that the traditional criteria separating the distinction needs to be re-thought.
However, such a re-interpretation of the public as a space where the neces-
sities of life are in fact to be considered, does not necessarily suggest that
the public realm is to be based upon precisely the same modes of relation
endemic to the family. Such an interpretation of the public would be, in
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relation to the traditional idealization of the family, the reverse idealization
of the public realm.
70 (Okin, 1991: 195).
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